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Abstract
We consider a standard two—country environment, where one of the
countries has rigid wages and unemployment, and analyze how factor
markets’ integration aﬀects the economy with respect to expectations-
driven ﬂuctuations. We demonstrate that by allowing free capital mo-
bility, indeterminacy is exported to the world economy. If further
liberalization is permitted, by allowing free movements of labor, the
scope for indeterminacy is reduced and open labor markets may pro-
duce a stabilizing eﬀect on the global macroeconomy. Whether this
also implies higher welfare in the long run depends on diﬀerentials in
average ﬁrm size across countries.
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The present paper analyses whether, in a world where goods and capital
markets are highly integrated, the liberalization of labor movements be-
tween countries, subject to diﬀerent labor market characteristics, may sta-
bilize the economies (with respect to expectation driven ﬂuctuations) and, in
addition, raise welfare (with respect to the steady state). Although several
studies have investigated the link between capital mobility and macroeco-
nomic performance, the existing macroeconomic literature has not, as yet,
properly addressed the implications of international labor movements. Our
work aims at ﬁlling this gap.
The question of migration, in a world where capital markets are highly
integrated, is taking centre stage in the debate about globalization. A pe-
culiarity of the recent wave of globalization is that increased integration in
goods and capital markets is accompanied by increased restrictions in labor
movements. However, is such an asymmetric process of integration of world
markets beneﬁcial or harmful for macroeconomic stability and eﬃciency? As
regards stability, one major concern is that increased ﬁnancial openness can
produce unwanted disturbances to economies in so far as domestic capital
becomes more responsive to expected future changes in international prices
and, correspondingly, magniﬁes the amplitude of ﬂuctuations in real wages
or employment levels.1 As regards eﬃciency, one major concern is that la-
bor movement liberalization, between countries with diﬀerent labor market
institutions, may exacerbate unemployment and reduce world output.2
The eﬀect of increased integration of world capital markets on macro-
economic ﬂuctuations depends on the structural characteristics of countries
and on the nature of shocks. As suggested by Obstfeld and Taylor (2004),
the often unpredictable direction of capital ﬂows in international markets,
points towards expectation driven shocks. Accordingly, in the present paper
we build a model in which endogenous ﬂuctuations in economic variables are
1See, e.g., Azariadis and Pissarides (2007), Bhagwati (1998), Prasad et al. (2003),
Rodrik (1997).
2Workers’ concern about the impact of globalization is a worldwide phenomenon (see
e.g., Edwards and Lusting 1997, ILO 1999 and Scheve and Slaughter 2001).
1driven by self-fulﬁlling changes in expectations, and we interpret macroeco-
nomic instability (stability) as local dynamic indeterminacy of the steady
state.3 Diﬀerences in the operation of labor markets, on the other hand,
may account for divergences in wage levels and for the existence of mi-
gration ﬂows between economies in which product and capital markets are
highly integrated.
A well established result, at least in the closed economy literature, is that
the existence of market distortions, in otherwise standard dynamic general
equilibrium models, can induce indeterminacy (see, for instance, Farmer
1999). In the present paper, we extend this type of analysis to the case of
open economies. Speciﬁcally, we develop a two-country dynamic overlapping
generations model, in which agents may only work when young (with a con-
stant marginal labor disutility), and consume when young and old (under a
Cobb Douglas utility function). Each country produces one identical good
(hence there is no trade based on comparative advantages) under a private
Cobb Douglas technology with labor externalities. Markets for output and
capital services are perfectly competitive, and the economies diﬀer only with
respect to their labor markets. We assume that one country operates under
full employment (with perfectly competitive labor markets), the autarkic
equilibrium converging to a determinate steady state; while the other coun-
try is characterized by involuntary unemployment (with eﬃciency wages).
The latter, under not particularly stringent parameter restrictions, displays
indeterminacy at the autarkic equilibrium and thereby endogenous ﬂuctua-
tions in output, employment, wages and interest rates may emerge. We then
analyze how free trade in capital and labor aﬀects the local stability prop-
erties of the world economy and the steady state levels of unemployment,
wages and output.4
3T h eo c c u r r e n c eo flocal indeterminacy implies that there is a continuum of determinis-
tic trajectories all converging to the steady state. In this case there are also inﬁnitely many
stochastic ﬂuctuations with rational expectations, close to the steady state, driven by self
fulﬁlling volatile expectations (see Guesnerie and Woodford, 1992). For this reason, the
occurrence of local indeterminacy is frequently associated to macroeconomic instability.
4Bertocchi (2003) also considers diﬀerential labor market structures within a dynamic
general equilibrium set up. However, the focus in her paper is on small open economies and
the analysis is concerned with the impact of capital market liberalization and unionization
2Our set up allow to focus on how diﬀerences in labor markets, per se,
aﬀect the outcome for the world economy of letting free movements of labor
across countries.5 We ﬁrst show that opening up the economy to free capital
movements enlarges the scope for indet e r m i n a c yi nt h er i g i dw a g ec o u n t r y
and brings indeterminacy to world markets. Thereby, the country with
perfectly competitive labor markets too experiences output ﬂuctuations and,
depending on expectations of future interest rates, capital ﬂows reversals
across countries can be observed. This result is not entirely surprising and
is consistent with earlier works by Lahiri (2001), Sakuragawa and Hamada
(2001), Weder (2001) and Meng and Velasco (2003) among others, although
these authors disregard distortions in labor markets. From a steady state
point of view, allowing for capital mobility does not aﬀect wages, capital,
unemployment or output levels.6
Allowing for labor mobility alongside capital mobility may eliminate in-
determinacy and, therefore, has stabilizing eﬀects at the global macroeco-
nomic level. From a steady state point of view, world economic integration
does not aﬀect wage and employment levels nor output in the rigid wage
country, while it aﬀects its unemployment level. Whether liberalization of
labor movements also implies higher welfare in the long run, however, cru-
cially depends on the gap in employment per ﬁrm (that is on average ﬁrm
size) between the two countries under autarky. In some cases labor mobility
helps in achieving both stability and eﬃciency. In particular, this occurs
if, prior to full integration, the level of employment per ﬁrm in the fully
employed competitive country falls suﬃciently short of the corresponding
level in the rigid wage country. In this case, under free labor movements,
on cross-country income convergence and distribution.
5Indeed, a relevant and intensively debated source of diﬀerence across countries lies
precisely in labor market institutions. See, for instance, Davis (1998), Freeman (1998)
and Bertola and Boeri (2002).
6An advantage of the simple structure we choose to consider - with identical Cobb
Douglas preferences and technologies across countries - is that the steady state interest
rates are always the same and identical between economies, even at the autarkic equilib-
rium. As a result, at the steady state, there are no incentives for capital movements across
countries, and capital ﬂows are induced by expectation shocks. In contrast, as we shall
see, diﬀerences in labor markets across countries create, at the steady state, diﬀerences in
expected labor returns conducive of labor ﬂo w sa c r o s sc o u n t r i e s .
3workers migrate towards the competitive country, unemployment decrease
and world output expands. If, instead, the competitive country has larger
levels of employment per ﬁrm than the rigid wage country, then, the rigid
wage country experiences net inﬂows of workers and higher unemployment,
and world output shrinks.
These results provide new insights on the long run welfare eﬀects of work-
ers’ migration and on its implications for macroeconomic instability linked
to globalization of capital markets. If workers are free to move, workers’
movements follow the direction of capital movements, which weakens the
conditions under which expectation driven ﬂuctuations may occur; there-
fore, we should expect less variability in macro-aggregates linked to changes
in expectations. In the long run, net migration ﬂows can go both ways, de-
pending on initial diﬀerentials in average ﬁrm size. Accordingly, economic
integration between a rigid and a competitive wage country does not neces-
sarily exacerbate unemployment in the rigid wage country.7 Although our
model is rather stylized, and abstracts from asymmetries across countries
that are not linked to labor markets, it can be related to recent labor in-
tegration experiments particularly in Europe. For instance, the latest wave
of migration from Poland into the UK demonstrates that the liberalization
of labor movements, between countries with highly integrated capital and
product markets but diﬀerent labor markets characteristics, can be beneﬁ-
cial for both the destination country and the country of origin.8
7This outcome is in sharp contrast with results obtained in Davis (1998) for a sta-
tic model. Our steady state results are also of relevance to dual-economy models à la
Harris and Todaro (1970). Contrary to Harris and Todaro, we show that liberalizing la-
bor movements, under internationally (or sectorally) mobile capital, may actually reduce
unemployment.
8It should be bared in mind that, as a result of the transition to market economies,
Eastern European countries experienced tremendous changes in their labor markets. By
the end of the 1990s, however, labor markets in these countries assumed characteristics
broadly similar to other EU members, including lack of ﬂexibility when compared to the
UK or Ireland (see Riboud et al., 2002).
The UK was the largest of the three countries (the others being Ireland and Sweden)
among the EU-15 that did not impose strict restrictions to workers coming from the eight
EU Accession countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Slovakia and Slovenia). Poland represents by far the largest of the Accession countries
and it also had the largest outﬂow of workers. At the time of the EU enlargement in 2004
the unemployment rate in Poland was almost 20%, while unemployment in the UK was
4The remainder of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we present the
structure of the model and obtain the perfect foresight equilibrium for the
closed economies. Section 3 focuses on the equilibrium of the world economy
under free capital movements, while equilibrium under both capital and
labor mobility is analyzed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2A u t a r k y
The world is made up of two countries, A and B, that share the same con-
sumption and production structure.9 Both countries have perfectly compet-
itive markets for output and capital services, and only diﬀer in the func-
tioning of labor markets. In country A there is involuntary unemployment,
while country B operates at full employment. All agents have rational ex-
pectations and, in what follows, we study the perfect foresight intertemporal
equilibria.
2.1 The model
In each period t =1 ,...,∞, a single output, used as consumption or as
capital good, is produced and it is taken as the numeraire. Within each
country there is a given number mi, i = A,B, of identical proﬁt maximizing







i,t , A > 0 and 0 <θ<1 (1)
where li,t represents the number of units of eﬀective labor employed by each




i,t represents productive labor externalities:10 li,t being the average level
at its natural rate (5%). By 2007, unemployment in Poland halved, while in the UK the
employment rate increased.
9Since we focus on ﬂuctuations driven by volatile expectations, we assume that prefer-
ences and technologies are time invariant.
10The existence of social increasing returns to scale, is a feature which is not peculiar
to our set up. See, for instance, Barinci and Chéron (2001), Coimbra et al. (2005) and
Lloyd Braga et al. (2007). As in Lloyd Braga et al. (2007), we use (country speciﬁc)
labor externalities to allow for the existence of indeterminacy with a positive interest rate.
Labor external eﬀects can be interpreted as coming from thick labor market eﬀects or
from knowledge spillovers.
5of employment in the country (which is taken as given by each ﬁrm) and v
being the degree of labor externalities (1+v measuring the degree of social
returns to scale).11 Given (1), for a proﬁt maximizing ﬁrm ki,t must satisfy
the following, at a symmetric equilibrium (
_
l i,t = li,t)
θAkθ−1
i,t l1−θ+ν
i,t = ri,t,( 2 )
where ri,t is the rental rate of capital.
Population is constant over time and agents live for two periods. In each
period t, there is a continuum of identical young agents, with a constant
given mass Ni, i = A,B, native from each country. Preferences of a typical
individual born at t are described by the following lifetime utility function
cα
i,tc1−α
i,t+1 − aei,t, 0 <α<1 and a>0 (3)
where ci,t and ci,t+1 are consumption in the young and old age, respectively,
and ei,t ∈ {0,1} represents the number of units of eﬀective labor (or eﬀort)
supplied.
A young employed worker at t (that does not shirk) contributes with one
unit of eﬀective labor (i.e., ei,t =1 ), receives a positive wage wi,t and saves
kh
i,t+1 in the form of productive capital goods, which are rented to ﬁrms in the
next period and used for consumption in the old age. We assume that capital
is totally depreciated in one period, so that ri,t is also the interest factor.
Accordingly, he/she chooses kh
i,t+1, ci,t, ci,t+1 to maximize his/her expected
lifetime utility subject to the following constraints: kh
i,t+1 = wi,t − ci,t and
ci,t+1 = ri,t+1kh
i,t+1.F r o mt h eﬁrst order conditions we obtain
kh
i,t+1 =( 1− α)wi,t (4)
ci,t = αwi,t (5)
ci,t+1 = ri,t+1(1 − α)wi,t ,
11Note that this technology exhibits constant returns to scale at the individual ﬁrm
private level. Also, note that, at a symmetric equilibrium (where li,t = li,t ), the aggregate
marginal productivity of labor curve is a standard downward sloping curve when v<θ .
6where ri,t+1 is the expected value, evaluated at period t, of the interest rate
in the next period, which under perfect foresight is identical to its realized
value. Using (3) and (5), the indirect utility of a young employed worker
(that does not shirk) is given by
V = αα(1 − α)1−αr1−α






Expression (7) deﬁnes the reservation wage. Note that, if a worker is un-
employed, then, V =0 ; accordingly, all workers are willing to work and to
supply ei,t =1for wi,t > ¯ wi,t,w h i l ef o rwi,t < ¯ wi,t the labor supply is zero.
Consider a perfectly competitive labor market. Then, the labor market
supply faced by each identical ﬁrm is inﬁnitely elastic at wi,t =¯ wi,t,a sl o n g
as the employment level does not exceed the mass nR
i of young agents (per
ﬁrm) resident in country i. Equilibrium may then lead to full employment
or to the existence of some unemployment. The ﬁnal outcome depends on
the marginal productivity of labor, which in turn is aﬀected by the level of
capital accumulated through past savings. However, under perfect compe-
tition involuntary unemployment would not emerge since, if li,t <n R
i wages
would be identical to the reservation wage. To account for the existence of
involuntary unemployment, we impose some form of labor market rigidity in
country A; while for country B we consider full employment and, to simplify,
a perfectly competitive labor market. In what follows we describe in detail
the labor market equilibrium in each country and obtain the corresponding
(general) equilibrium dynamic equations.
2.2 Equilibrium with unemployment and eﬃciency wages:
Country A
2.2.1 The labor market. For country A,w eu s eas i m p l i ﬁed version of
the Shapiro-Stiglitz (1984) eﬃciency wage model, which accounts for the
7existence of involuntary unemployment.12 If a worker employed in a ﬁrm
is caught shirking (i.e., eA,t =0 )h e / s h ei sﬁred, that is the ﬁrm does not
pay the wage and he/she is forced to enter the unemployment pool and
his/her indirect utility is zero. However, employers can only imperfectly
monitor workers. The monitoring technology is not made explicit, we simply
assume that the ex-ante probability of shirking and being caught is given
by 0 <λ<1. A young agent faces three possibilities: being unemployed,
being employed and not shirking or being employed and shirking (eA,t =0 ,
wA,t > 0). Using (3) and (5), the indirect utility of an employed worker that
shirks is V =( 1−λ)αα(1−α)1−αr1−α
A,t+1wA,t. Then, using (6) it can be easily
checked that employed workers have no incentives to shirk when wA,t ≥
¯ wA,t
λ .
The latter is the non shirking condition (NSC). Firms choose wA, lA and kA
such that proﬁts are maximized. Since the output of a worker who shirks is
zero, at equilibrium the positive wage paid by ﬁrms should be such that it
induces workers not to shirk, that is each employed worker supply et =1 .








A,t − wA,tlA,t − rA,tkA,t
´
, s.t. NSC
Obviously the NSC is binding: thus from the ﬁrst order conditions we ob-
tain, at a symmetric equilibrium, expression (2) and
(1 − θ)Akθ
A,tl−θ+v
A,t = wA,t (8)
¯ wA,t
λ
= wA,t ,( 9 )
where the reservation wage ¯ wA,t is deﬁn e di n( 7 ) .
We assume that the level of employment satisfying (8) veriﬁes lA,t <n R
A,t,
so that we obtain a symmetric equilibrium with unemployment.13 Expres-
sion (8) shows that the level of employment is such that the wage is identical
12It should be stressed that, although we focus on eﬃciency wages as the source of
rigidity in country A labor market, analogous results would apply if we consider monopoly
unions or search generated unemployment.
13This amounts to assume that the marginal productivity at full employment is lower
than
¯ wA,t
λ . See also footnote 18, where conditions on the parameters ensure that a steady
state with unemployment satisﬁes this assumption.
8to its respective marginal product, as in perfectly competitive markets. Also,
given the existence of private constant returns to scale, proﬁts are zero.14
In contrast to perfect competition, though, wages are set as a mark up over
the reservation wage (see 9); thus workers are better oﬀ when employed, and
unemployment is involuntary in nature.15
Using (8)-(9) we may characterize the labor market equilibrium in coun-
try A through the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 . A symmetric equilibrium in the labor market with unemploy-










wA,t =( 1− θ)Akθ
A,tl−θ+v
A,t > ¯ wA,t,w h e r e ¯ wA,t is given by (7).
As long as international labor movements are not allowed, all young res-
idents in country A a r en a t i v ef r o mA and, therefore, in Lemma 1 we have
nR
A,t = NA/mA ≡ nA.A l s o ,¯ wA,t depends on rA,t+1, implying that the
equilibrium level of wages and employment is inﬂuenced by expectations
of future interest rates.16 As we shall see, this opens the door to ﬂuctua-
tions in wages and employment driven by self-fulﬁlling volatile expectations
(endogenous ﬂuctuations).17
Endogenous ﬂuctuations may have relevant welfare implications. To see
how, consider an equilibrium with volatile expectations and ﬂuctuations
14Note that, if the respective marginal product of labor was higher than the wage set
by the ﬁrm (according to 9) we would obtain the full employment equilibrium, and proﬁts
would be positive. However, if proﬁts were distributed to the young generations (the
workers) it turns out that the general equilibrium dynamic equations would be identical
to the case of full employment and perfect competition. In this situation the two countries
would be symmetric - both characterized by full employment - and no interesting dynamics
would occur.
15In the limit case of λ =1unemployment would no longer be involuntary. Moreover,
the case λ =1with unemployment represents simultaneously a monopsony and a perfectly
competitive labor market, since the labor supply curve is inﬁnitely elastic for lA,t <n
R
A,t.
16Note that the unemployment rate in any period t is given by μt =1−lt/nA.H e n c ei t s
value is determined by the value of lt and also depends on expectations of future interest
rates.
17It should be stressed that, irrespective of being voluntary or involuntary, it is the ex-
istence of unemployment per se that creates the possibility of ﬂuctuations in employment.
In fact, employment per ﬁrm would be ﬁxed at nA under full employment.
9around a steady state. In a period where the expected future interest rate is
low (relative to its steady state level) workers face a higher unemployment
rate; whereas, in a period where the expected future interest rate is high the
reverse would happen. Since it is likely that some generations beneﬁtw h i l e
others are harmed by ﬂuctuations, we cannot ap r i o r iestablish whether an
equilibrium with ﬂuctuations driven by expectations is welfare improving or
not for the economy as a whole; it depends on the social welfare function. If
the latter is suﬃciently concave in utility of diﬀerent generations, equilibrium
ﬂuctuations may become quite costly from an inter-generational equity point
of view. Moreover, since in any period t w a g e sa r es e ta sam a r ku po v e rt h e
reservation wage, employed workers are better oﬀ than unemployed workers,
implying that employment ﬂuctuations aﬀect not only inter-generational but
also intra-generational equity.
2.2.2 Equilibrium dynamic system. At equilibrium the aggre-
gate demand for capital services, mAkt+1, must be identical to its aggregate
supply, kh
t+1mAlA,t. Hence, using (4) we have that kt+1 =( 1 − α)ltwt.
Combining the latter and expression (8), we obtain the following capital














λααθ1−αγ1+θ(1−α). Equations (10) and (11) deﬁne a two dimen-
sional dynamic model, and characterize the equilibrium in terms of the two
state variables (kA,l A).I n p e r i o d t, kA is a predetermined variable whose
value is given by past saving. By contrast, lA is a non predetermined vari-
able whose value is inﬂuenced by expectations of future interest rates via
the workers’ reservation wage.
Deﬁnition 1 . An intertemporal perfect foresight equilibrium under autarky
for country A is a sequence (kA,t, lA,t) ∈ <2
++,t=1 ,....∞, such that (10)
and (11) are satisﬁed, where 0 <λ<1 is the ex-ante probability of shirking
and being caught.
102.2.3 Steady state. In country A, the interior steady state (kA,l A) ∈
<2
++, verifying the dynamic system (10)-(11), with kA = kA,t = kA,t+1 > 0












Equation (13) gives a unique solution for the steady state value lA.18 Sub-
stituting the latter into (12) we obtain the steady state value of kA.
The steady state values of the wage and interest rate are, accordingly,
given by: wA =
£
(1 − α)θ (1 − θ)Alν
A
¤ 1
1−θ and rA = θ/(1−α)(1− θ).T h e r e -
fore, this economy has a positive interest rate at the steady state equilibrium,
i.e., r>1, if and only if the propensity to consume when young satisﬁes the
following restriction, α>(1 − 2θ)/(1−θ). To ensure this, and other results













0 <θ<1/2 . (15)
These restrictions cover most empirically relevant values of θ and α.19
2.2.4 Equilibrium dynamics and indeterminacy. Local indetermi-
nacy occurs when the number of stable eigenvalues is higher than the number
of predetermined variables. The system (10) and (11) is loglinear and the
associated 2x2 Jacobian matrix is provided in Appendix B. Since in our
model there is only one predetermined variable, kA, indeterminacy arises
18By Lemma 1, at equilibrium lA <n A. In order for this condition to be fulﬁlled










1−θ (1 − θ)
θ+α(1−θ)
1−θ . This restriction ensures that, at the steady
state deﬁned in (12)-(13), there is unemployment, i.e. lA <n A, and it also ensures that
lA,t <n A along trajectories suﬃciently close to the steady state.
19Estimates from national accounting for OECD countries are usually in accordance
with values of the capital share of output, θ, that belong to the 0.25-0.4 range, and to
values of the propensity to consume when young, α, usually higher than 0.5 .
11when both eigenvalues (in absolute value) are lower than 1. The proposi-
tion below dictates parameter conditions under which local indeterminacy
occurs.20
Proposition 1 . Assume that (14)-(15) are satisﬁed, and deﬁne v
¯
au ≡
(α(1 − θ) − (1 − 2θ))/(1 − α) and ¯ vau ≡ 2(1 − α(1 − θ))/(2α − 1).T h e n ,
country A exhibits indeterminacy under autarky if and only if v
¯
au <v<¯ vau.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Note that assuming α>1−2θ
1−θ implies that v
¯
au > 0. Therefore indetermi-
nacy, with a positive interest rate and capital accumulation, requires a min-
imum degree of labor externalities bounded away from zero.21 Nevertheless,
indeterminacy still occurs with a suﬃciently small degree of externalities,
consistent with empirical evidence22 and with a standard negatively sloped
(aggregate) labor demand curve, i.e., v<θ . For instance, indeterminacy
prevails when α =0 .6, θ =1 /3 and v =0 .18.23 This means that, under em-
pirically relevant values of the propensity to consume, capital share in out-
put and externalities, there are stochastic endogenous ﬂuctuations, whereby
employment and wages ﬂuctuate due to self-fulﬁlling volatile expectations.
To gain an intuition of why indeterminacy requires a lower bound on
externalities, consider the case of an economy that, at period t,i sa ti t s
steady state for some time and that, for some reason, experiences an increase
in the expected future interest rate. Then, the reservation wage, ¯ wA,t,w i l l
decrease (see 7) and (see Lemma 1) the current level of employment per
ﬁrm, lA,t, will increase (assuming ν<θ ), leading to an increase in capital
accumulation kA,t+1 (driven by the wage bill). This, by itself, would produce
a tendency for a decrease in the interest rate at t+1. However, the increase
in kA,t+1 increases the marginal productivity at t +1 , inducing per se an
20Note that the occurrence of indeterminacy is not caused by the existence of eﬃciency
wages, that is λ does not inﬂuence the conditions for indeterminacy (see footnote 16).
21Lloyd-Braga et al. (2007) discuss this property at length. Note also that α<
1+2θ
1+3θ
ensures ¯ νau >v
¯
au, and that the same restriction on α applies in Lloyd-Braga et al. (2007)
for an inﬁnitely elastic labor supply.
22The degree of externalities found in empirical works is quite small, usually below 0.3.
See, Basu and Fernald (1997) and Burnside (1996).
23For α =0 .6 and θ =1 /3 we obtain v
¯
au =0 .17 and ¯ vau =6 .
12increase in employment per ﬁrm at t+1(since ∂ loglt+1/∂ logkt+1 = θ/(θ−
v)). Higher employment triggers in turn an increase in the interest rate at
t +1 . If employment per ﬁrm at t +1rises by a suﬃcient amount, that
is if v is suﬃciently high, its positive eﬀect on the realized interest rate at
t +1will oﬀ set the negative eﬀect due to the increase in kA,t+1.A s a
result, the initial expectation of an increase in future interest rates can be
self-fulﬁlling. Indeterminacy also implies that equilibrium trajectories will
eventually return back to the steady state. In our case, we should observe
a reversal in the future capital stock, that is the future wage bill should
decrease. The latter will only be possible if lA,t+1 does not increase too
much. Note, however, that the required increase in lA,t+1 needed for rA,t+1
to rise is lower the higher the labor externality. Accordingly, a necessary
condition for indeterminacy to occur is the existence of a lower bound on
labor externalities (i.e., ν> v
¯
au).
2.3 Equilibrium with full employment and a perfectly com-
petitive labor market: Country B
2.3.1 The labor market.I nc o u n t r yB, we consider a perfectly competi-
tive labor market with full employment.24 The ﬁr ml a b o rd e m a n di ne a c h
period t is, therefore, determined by the identity between wages and the




B,t.F u l l e m p l o y -
ment is obtained when the corresponding marginal product of labor exceeds
the reservation wage. Denoting by nR
B the mass of young agents per ﬁrm
resident in country B, it is straightforward to obtain the following Lemma.
Lemma 2 . A symmetric equilibrium in the labor market with full employ-
ment in country B is characterized by
lB,t = nR
B,
wB,t =( 1− θ)Akθ
B,tlν−θ




24To simplify the exposition and avoid concerns on the distribution of proﬁts (see foot-
note 14), we characterize the economy with full employment as perfectly competitive.
Note, also, that full employment in the perfectly competitive country B is needed to en-
sure the existence of a two country equilibrium when both capital and labor are free to
move. Later on, in Section 4, we provide a comprehensive discussion of the issue.
13As long as international labor movements are not allowed, all young
residents in country B are native from B and, therefore, in Lemma 2 we
have nR
B = NB/mB ≡ nB.
2.3.2 The equilibrium dynamic system. In country B the equilib-
rium dynamics is summarized by a ﬁrst-order diﬀerence equation; namely,
the capital accumulation equation, kB,t+1 =( 1− α)wB,tnB.U s i n gL e m m a





Deﬁnition 2 . An intertemporal perfect foresight equilibrium under autarky
for country B is a sequence kB,t > 0, such that (16) is satisﬁed.
2.3.4 Steady state. The steady state, kB, verifying the dynamic equa-





Using (2) and Lemma 2, the steady state values of the interest rate and wage
are, accordingly, given by rB = θ/(1−α)(1− θ) and wB =
£




2.3.4 Equilibrium dynamics and (in)determinacy. Since there is
full employment and capital is a predetermined variable, there is no in-
determinacy at the autarkic equilibrium. Moreover, since the equilibrium
dynamics, given by (16), is loglinear and θ<1, all equilibrium trajectories
converge to the steady state. The following proposition restates the result.
Proposition 2 . Under autarky, country B has a (stable) determinate
steady state.











B .T h i sr e s t r i c -
tion implies that wB > ¯ wB at the steady state and therefore wB,t ≥ ¯ wB,t close to the
steady state, as required by Lemma 2.
143 Free capital mobility
In this section we ﬁrst study the equilibrium dynamic system for the case of
free international capital mobility. We then show that a steady state exists,
study the occurrence of local indeterminacy, and derive relevant comparative
static results.
3.1 Equilibrium dynamic system
Liberalization of capital movements between both countries implies a no
arbitrage condition in the world capital market, that is interest rates must
be identical in every period. Hence, the equilibrium world capital stock
(Kt), available for production in every period t, must be distributed across
ﬁrms of both countries in a way such that
Kt = mAkA,t + mBkB,t (18)
rt ≡ rA,t = rB,t. (19)
These equations, together with (2), can be used to obtain the level of capital
rented by a representative ﬁrm in each country, that is kA,t and kB,t,a sa



















Capital accumulation in the world is driven by the sum of saving (i.e., labor
income) in both countries,
Kt+1 =( 1− α)(wA,tmAlA,t + wB,tmBlB,t). (23)
From this equation, substituting the expressions for wA and wB as given
in Lemma 1 and 2, and using (20)-(21), we obtain the following dynamic
equation





Ht≡ H (lA,t)=1+zt, zt satisfying (22) with lB,t= nB. (25)
Combining (2), (20), (25), (24) and Lemma 1, we obtain the other dynamic












Equations (24) and (26) deﬁne the equilibrium dynamic system written in
terms of two variables: K, whose value is determined by the world past
savings, and lA,w h o s ev a l u ei si n ﬂuenced by current expectations of future
rental rates.26
3.2 Steady state
A steady state, (K,lA), for the system (24) and (26) is a solution of the














Note that steady state level of employment per ﬁrm in country A,a sg i v e n
in (28), is identical to the steady state level of employment per ﬁrm under
autarky, as given in (13). By use of (28), (27), (20) and (21), it can be
checked that the steady state values kA and kB are the same as in the au-
tarkic equilibrium. Hence, wages and interest rates at the steady state are
also the same.
To gain an intuition of why steady state values are unchanged note that,
by use of (21), country B capital share of world capital, evaluated at the
steady state, is given by sk
B ≡ mBkB/K = z/(1 + z).W h i l e , b y u s e o f
Lemma 1 and 2 and (20)-(22), country B saving share of world savings,
26Note that, although K is predetermined, kA and kB are non-predetermined variables.
The values of kA and kB, given in (20)-(21) with z as given in (25), are inﬂuenced by
employment per ﬁrm in country A, which depends on the reservation wage and thereby
on expectations of future interest rates.
16evaluated at the steady state, is given by ss
B ≡ wBnB/(wAlA+wBnB)=
z/(1 + z). Therefore, at the steady state, the amount of capital goods
used in production in country B is equal to investment in capital goods
through savings (sB ≡ sk
B = ss
B); the same applying to country A (sk
A =
ss
A ≡ 1 − sB). This means that, at the steady state, there are no net
exports or imports of capital services between countries, and the values of
lA, kA and kB are the same irrespective of capital mobility. However, as
discussed in the following section, indeterminacy may occur and in this case
there are stochastic equilibrium trajectories, driven by self-fulﬁlling volatile
expectations, along which net capital ﬂows between the two countries are
observed.
3.3 Local Equilibrium dynamics and indeterminacy
The dynamic system (24)-(26) implicitly deﬁnes a two dimensional non lin-
ear map G, such that (Kt+1/mA,l A,t+1)=G (Kt/mA,l A,t) around the
steady state. We follow the usual procedure of (log)linearizing around the
steady state and studying the eigenvalues of the associated 2x2 Jacobian
matrix evaluated at the steady state. Details are in Appendix B. The fol-
lowing proposition dictates parameter conditions under which indeterminacy
occurs.





(1−α)+sB(α−(1−2θ)/(1−θ)) and ¯ vk ≡
2(1−α(1−θ))(1−sB)
(2α−1)+2sB(1/(1−θ)−α).T h e n ,t h e




Proof. See Appendix B.
In view of Proposition 3, liberalizing capital movements entails that ’lo-
cal’ shocks to expectations may now aﬀect other countries and render the
latter also susceptible to equilibrium ﬂuctuations driven by self-fulﬁlling
volatile expectations. Indeed, an increase in expected future interest rates,
for instance, induces an increase (if v<θ ) in the current level of employment
per ﬁrm in country A and, thereby, an increase in its current interest rate,
rA,t, which, becoming higher than rB,t, induces capital ﬂows from country
17B to country A, leading to ﬂuctuations in wages and output in country B as
well. Hence, the direction of capital ﬂows is entirely determined by expec-
tations and, depending on the latter, capital ﬂows reversals across countries
can be observed.
Note, moreover, that the lower bound on externalities, needed for inde-
terminacy, is now smaller than that required for indeterminacy to prevail in




au since 0 <s B < 1. For instance, when
α =0 .6, θ =1 /3 and sB =1 /2 indeterminacy prevails when v =0 .09.27
Therefore, under capital mobility it is easier to obtain ﬂuctuations driven
by self-fulﬁlling expectations with small values of ν consistent with empir-
ical evidence. To gain intuition, consider the sequence of events following
an increase in the expected future interest rate analyzed under autarky. As
discussed above, the initial increase in lA,t will tend to trigger, in period t,
inﬂows of capital from country B into country A; which, will further increase
current saving in country A, while it will decrease current saving in country
B. Hence, ceteris paribus, a diﬀerential between future returns in the two
countries would arise, which cannot be sustained under perfect capital mo-
bility. Indeed, the diﬀerential in future returns induces a reversal in capital
movements from country A to country B, which re-establish the no arbi-
trage condition in capital markets at t +1 . The capital inﬂows in country
B at t +1 ,o ﬀ setting the initial outﬂow at t, help bringing the equilibrium
trajectories back to the steady state, as required when indeterminacy oc-
curs. Therefore, due to these additional eﬀects linked to capital movements,
externalities need not to be as high as under autarky.
4 Integrated equilibrium
Assuming free capital mobility between countries we now allow for free in-
ternational labor mobility. Workers can seek employment in either country
A or country B, and can only be employed in the country of residence. To
simplify, we ignore the travel costs of migration and assume that ﬁrms do
27With α =0 .6, θ =1 /3 and sB =1 /2 we have that v
¯
k =0 .08, while ¯ vk =0 .55 >θ(see
footnote 23). Remark that ¯ vk < ¯ vau; however, this is of little relevance because ¯ vk =0 .55
is still well above empirically plausible values of ν.
18not discriminate workers by their origin. As in previous sections, we focus
on (two-country) equilibria characterized by eﬃciency wages and unemploy-
ment in country A, and perfect competition and full employment in country
B. Therefore, Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 still apply, where the mass of young
resident per ﬁrm in each country, nR
i,t,c a nn o wd i ﬀer from the mass of young
native per ﬁrm, ni,t, i = A,B.
4.1 Equilibrium Dynamic System
Equilibrium in the world labor market is attained when, in each period t,
the expected utility of working in country A is identical to the expected
utility of working in country B. Under free capital movements (19) applies




in view of (6) the following no arbitrage condition in the world labor market
must hold in every period




(wA,t − ¯ wt), (29)
where lA,t/nR
A,t is the probability of being employed in country A.
Notice that, from Lemma 1, we have wA,t > ¯ wt and lA,t <n R
A,t.T h e r e -
fore, a two-country equilibrium in the world labor market implies that
wA,t >w B,t > ¯ wt, that is wages do not equalize.28 Dividing both sides
of (29) by wA,t, and recalling that, by (9), ¯ wt/wA,t = λ,t h ea b o v en oa r b i -
trage condition can be re-written as,
wB,t
wA,t





From (30) it can be seen that, for a given lA,t,t h el o w e ri snet migration into
country A, that is the lower is nR
A,t−nA, the lower is the wage gap (wB,t/wA,t
28Note that the no arbitrage condition in world labor market, requiring wB,t > ¯ wt,i s
not compatible with an equilibrium where unemployment exists in country B.I nf a c t ,a
two-country equilibrium would not be possible if unemployment prevailed in the perfectly
competitive country B. In our model, if unemployment prevailed in country B,w a g e s
would be identical to the reservation wage (wB,t =¯ wt) and the expected utility of a
worker living in B would be zero, which is identical to the utility of being unemployed.
On the other hand, the expected utility derived by moving to country A would be positive
(since wA,t > ¯ wt); hence, no young agents will be willing to live and work in country B.












From Lemma 2 recall that lB,t = nR
B,t,h e n c enR
B,t also represents the level
of employment per ﬁrm in Country B.B yd e ﬁnition, the world young pop-
ulation N satisﬁes,
N ≡ mAnA + mBnB = mAnR
A,t + mBnR
B,t. (32)
Using (32), expression (31) can be re-written as,
nR
B,t = C(lA,t,n R
B,t) ≡ lA,t
Ã







Combining Lemma 1, Lemma 2 and (23) - and recalling that the no arbitrage
condition in the world capital market implies that (20)-(22) must be satis-
ﬁed - the dynamic world capital accumulation equation and the dynamic
equation for employment per ﬁrm in country A are given, respectively, by




















Note that the only diﬀerence between this dynamic system and that with
free capital mobility (24-26) lies in the expression for zt,a se m p l o y m e n tp e r
ﬁrm in country B is now aﬀected by changes in employment per ﬁrm in
country A through (33).
4.2 Steady state




























4.2.1 Existence. First note that equation (38) gives us the unique solution
for the steady state value lA.T h e ng i v e nlA, and using (32), equation (39)




























A steady state value for nR
A/lA is thus a solution of (40) and, by Lemma 1,
it must also satisfy nR
A/lA > 1. Since equation (40) is non linear multiple
steady states may exist. In what follows we state necessary and suﬃcient
conditions on the world level of young population, N, for the existence of a
unique steady state nR
A/lA > 1.
Proposition 4 . Assume that v<1 − θ and deﬁne N1 ≡ (mA + mB)lA,
where lA satisﬁes (38). Then, under Lemma 1, a unique steady state nR
A/lA >
1 exists if and only if N>N 1.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Using the steady state values of lA and nR
A/lA we can then determine the
corresponding steady state value of nR
A and of net migration into country A,
i.e., nR
A − nA. The associated steady state level of employment per ﬁrm in
country B is, by use of (32), nR
B = N/mB −(mA/mB)nR
A. Finally, given lA
and nR
B, the steady state value for K is obtained through (37).
4.2.2 Welfare We now evaluate welfare properties of the steady state,
by analyzing how migration ﬂows aﬀect economic activity in both countries.
From expression (13), (28) and (38) it can be seen that the level of employ-
ment per ﬁrm in country A is identical to the level obtained under autarky
or free capital mobility. Also by use of (2), (8), (37), (38) and (20), it can be
checked that r, wA and kA remain the same.29 Using Lemma 2, (21)-(22) and
29Note that, as in the case of perfect capital mobility, there are no net capital movements





21(37), and given the steady state value of nR
B, we can derive the steady state





1−θ ,a n dt h es t e a d y
state level of wages in country B, wB =
£
(1 − α)θ (1 − θ)A(nR
B)ν¤ 1
1−θ,w h i c h
are both increasing in nR
B. Hence, using (32), it can be established that the
lower is nR
A, the lower is net migration in country A, the higher is nR
B and
thereby kB and wB, and the smaller the wage gap between the two countries
(see 30). Since wages, capital and employment per ﬁrm in country A do not
vary with respect to migration ﬂows, a steady state with a lower value for nR
A
is superior welfarewise than one with higher values of nR
A, under a utilitarian
social welfare function for the world. The following proposition summarizes.
Proposition 5 . Assume that conditions stated in Proposition 4 hold.
Then, the steady state level of net migration into country A is negatively
correlated with the wage, capital and employment per ﬁrm in country B,
and with world welfare (according to a utilitarian social welfare function);
and it is positively correlated with the wage gap between the two countries.
We now analyze how unemployment in country A, wages, capital and
employment per ﬁrm in country B, and world output compare with the
corresponding steady state levels realized under autarky or free capital mo-
bility. Note that, although the steady state level of lA does not change with
respect to the free capital or autarky case, unemployment may increase or
decrease according to whether net migration into country A is positive or
negative.
Indeed, if there are net migration ﬂows into country A (i.e., nR
A >n A) un-
employment, measured by mA(nR
A−lA), will be higher than the correspond-
ing level under autarky and free capital mobility, measured by mA (nA − lA).
Since, from (32), the identity mA(nR
A−nA)=mB(nB−nR
B) must hold, then,
positive net migration in country A corresponds to a decrease in the level
of employment per ﬁrm in country B relative to the cases of free capital
mobility and autarky, i.e., nR
B <n B.A s a r e s u l t wB and kB will also be
lower, and the steady state level of output at the world level also decreases
relative to the case of autarky or free capital mobility. Denoting by n∗
B the
level of employment per ﬁrm in country B at which the return of working
22in country B is identical to that of working in country A at the steady state
under autarky (and free capital mobility), then the conditions under which
there is positive or negative net migration into country A can be summarized
as follows.
Proposition 6 . Assume that the conditions stated in Proposition 4 hold
and deﬁne n∗
B ≡ (λ +( 1− λ)(lA/nA))
1−θ
v lA. Then, compared to the steady
state under autarky or free capital mobility, the steady state of the fully
integrated economy exhibits:
(i) Positive net migration and higher unemployment in country A,l o w e r
wages, capital and employment per ﬁrm in country B and lower output in
t h ew o r l d ,i fa n do n l yi fnB >n ∗
B.
(ii) Negative net migration and lower unemployment in country A,h i g h e r
wages, capital and employment per ﬁrm in country B and higher output in
t h ew o r l d ,i fa n do n l yi fnB <n ∗
B.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Propositions 5 and 6 (i) imply that eliminating barriers to international
factor movements may induce a decrease in world output and welfare.30
Propositions 5 and 6 (ii) imply that low employment per ﬁrm in the perfectly
competitive full employment economy relative to the rigid wage country, be-
fore integration, induce positive net migration into the competitive economy
and creates a more eﬃcient world. Indeed, this is the outcome one would
expect in partial equilibrium, or in a static model, if both countries were
characterized by perfectly competitive labor markets and full employment
and factor movements were liberalized. In this case workers would move to
the country oﬀering a higher wage, that is from the labor abundant coun-
try to the labor scarce country, until real wages are equalized. As a result
there would be a world redistribution of workers to the advantage of the
more productive country and an expansion in world output. In our dynamic
general equilibrium model, where one of the two countries is characterized
30Given that, here, we are analyzing economies operating under several market distor-
tions, this result is consistent with the theory of the second best, according to which the
correction of one market failure does not necessarily improve welfare.
23by rigid wages and unemployment, however, the process is diﬀerent. Recall




θ (1 − θ)Alν
i
i
, i = A,B; that is wages at the steady state
are positively related with employment per ﬁrm or, equivalently, with the
average ﬁrm size.31 Accordingly if, under autarky or free capital mobility,
country B is suﬃciently less labor abundant than country A, the wage in
country B is much lower than in country A and expected income of working
in B is relatively low (see 29). To ensure no arbitrage in the world labor mar-
ket, then, the wage in country B has to be higher under full integration. As
a result, wages and the average ﬁrm size (i.e, nR
B)i nt h ec o m p e t i t i v ec o u n t r y
increase, unemployment in the rigid wage country (i.e., nR
A − lA)d e c r e a s e s
and world output expands. Moreover, although wages do not equalize, the
wage gap between countries is reduced (see 30).
4.3 Local dynamics and (in)determinacy
Compared to the case of free capital mobility, the conditions for indeter-
minacy now are also function of an additional parameter η ∈ (1,+∞) that
represents the elasticity of employment per ﬁrm in country B with respect
to employment per ﬁrm in country A, evaluated at the steady state.32 The
proposition below summarizes the conditions under which local indetermi-
nacy prevails.










(α−(1−2θ)/(1−θ))sB and η2 ≡ 1+
(2α−1)
2(1/(1−θ)−α)sB. Then, the world
economy exhibits local indeterminacy under full integration if and only if
one of the following set of conditions hold:
(a) ¯ vl >v> v
¯
l and 1 <η<η 2,o r
(b) v> v
¯
l and η2 <η<η 1
31This happens because in our economy capital, being driven by the wage bill, is in-
creasing in employment per ﬁrm. Hence, when the latter increases, the level of capital per
ﬁrm increases as well, which, by increasing the marginal productivity of labor, leads to an
increase in wages at steady state. Note that, in our model, this is true even for very small
levels of labor externalities.
32See Appendix A, Lemma 4.
24Proof. See Appendix B.
Since the minimum bound on labor externalities required for indetermi-




au), while the upper
bound is lower (¯ vl < ¯ vau), the range of values under which indeterminacy
occurs is smaller in the integrated equilibrium than in autarky. Accordingly,
indeterminacy is more diﬃcult to obtain with free international movements
of capital and labor. To explain why, we refer to the same example analyzed
previously, where we considered an increase in the expected future interest
rate. Earlier we saw that, following an increase in the expected future in-
terest rate at time t, lA,t increases. Since the elasticity of employment per
ﬁrm in country B with respect to employment per ﬁrm in country A (i.e, η)
is positive, higher lA,t implies migration into country B and an increase in
current employment per ﬁrm in country B.33 Moreover, capital now ﬂows
out of country A into country B. Indeed, since η>1, nR
B,t/lA,t and zt
increase with lA,t (see 22), therefore kB,t = Kt
zt
1+zt also increases (see 21).
This implies in turn that, for a given predetermined value Kt,c a p i t a lﬂows
from country A to country B. As a result, under free labor movements,
current savings tend to increase in both countries and so does world capital
at t +1 .34 The latter renders more diﬃcult the occurrence of an increase
in rt+1, as initially expected at time t. A l s o ,t h ei n c r e a s ei nw o r l dc a p i t a l
tends to increase labor productivity and employment per ﬁrm, which induces
a further increase in world savings at t +1 , and thereby of world capital in
t+2, reinforcing the initial swerving away from the steady state observed at
time t. Hence the reversal of equilibrium trajectories, required for indeter-
minacy, is now more diﬃcult to obtain. Finally, note that migration ﬂows
at t are higher the higher is the responsiveness of employment per ﬁrm in
country B to changes in employment per ﬁrm in country A;t h e r e f o r e ,f o r
indeterminacy to occur the elasticity η needs to be bounded from above.
33Note that, due to the existence of unemployment in country A, migration into country
B does not imply changes in employment per ﬁrm in country A.
34It should be stressed that the current capital outﬂow from country A may partially
damp the increase in savings due to the rise in employment lA,t.
255C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we have shown that labor movement liberalization, between
economies with integrated capital markets and diﬀerent labor market char-
acteristics, helps to achieve higher aggregate stability by reducing the scope
for expectation driven ﬂuctuations. Our results also suggest that, if the
competitive country operating at full employment becomes a net importer
of workers, then moving to a fully integrated world economy brings about
both macroeconomic stability and eﬃciency. If instead, as a result of labor
movement liberalization, the rigid wage country becomes a net importer of
workers, then the world economy faces a trade oﬀ between eﬃciency and
stability. Whether the rigid wage country becomes a net importer or ex-
porter of workers depends on how large is the gap in the average ﬁrm size
between the rigid wage and competitive countries before integration.
26Appendix A: Steady State Integrated Equilib-
rium - Proofs
Proof of Proposition 4 (Existence and uniqueness of the steady state).
In Figure 1 we plot the functions LHS(
nR
A


















lA ∈ (0,∞), considering lA ﬁxed and given





deﬁnes a convex nega-
tively sloped function, going to inﬁnity as nR
A/lA tends to 0, and going to
(mB/mA)λ(1−θ)/ν as nR












































is represented by a line with a constant slope
identical to −1. The higher is N the more outwards the line LHS is. See




three diﬀerent values of N: N2, N1 and N>N 1.T h e v a l u e N2 is such
that the line LHS is tangent to the RHS curve. By inspecting Figure 1,
we can see that for N>N 2 the line LHS always crosses the RHS twice:
at a lower value nR




¢∗,w i t hRHS0(aN) < −1,a n da t
a higher value nR




¢∗,w i t hRHS0(bN) > −1. However,
aNand bN can only be a steady state for a given N,i ft h e yt a k eav a l u e
higher than 1.L e t N1 be the value of N such that either aN1or bN1 take
the value 1,i . e . ,(1 + mB/mA)mAlA ≡ N1.N o t et h a taN decreases with N





¢ss > 1.F o r N2 <N<N 1 there are no steady states if
bN1 =1(and aN1 < 1). Two steady states would exist for N2 <N<N 1 if
aN1 =1(and bN1 < 1). Finally for N<N 2 there are no steady states.¥
We now illustrate some other related results, which are important for
27proofs of Proposition 6 and Proposition 7. We highlight them in two Lem-
mas.
Lemma 3 Under the conditions stated in Proposition 4 and given (A1), the





Proof. From observation of Figure 1, notice that when N>N 1,t h e

















= −1. Given convexity of the RHS(nR
A/lA),





The other result of relevance is linked to the domain of η, that is the
elasticity of employment per ﬁrm in country B with respect to employment
per ﬁrm in country A, in accordance with (33), and evaluated at the steady
state.



























,w h e r e
sP ≡ nR
BmB/nR
AmA > 0 represents the ratio of residents in country B
and in country A, evaluated at the steady state under analysis, and sB ≡
z/(1 + z) ∈ (0,1) represents, as under perfect capital mobility, country B





1−θ > 0.U s i n g









ss) . By Lemma 3, we then have





P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6(Net migration) To prove the result of Propo-
sition 6, we just have to show that under condition (i) there is negative net
migration into country B and that under condition (ii) there is positive net














lA.( A 2 )
28From (A2) it can be seen that if nB = n∗
B ≡
³
λ +( 1− λ) lA
nA
´1−θ
v lA,t h e n
net migration is zero, since nR
B = nB.
Diﬀerentiating (A2) with respect to nR











is given by (A1). Since, by Lemma 3,








∂nB < 0.T h e r e f o r e ,i fnB decreases from
³







λ +( 1− λ) lA
nA
´1−θ
v lA,s ot h a tnR
B − nB > 0,t h a t
is positive net migration into country B.T h i sp r o v e s( ii) of Proposition 6.
A symmetric argument proves (i). ¥
Appendix B: Local Indeterminacy - Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 (Autarky). The system (10) and (11) is log-
linear and deviations from the steady state, dLogKA,t+1 = LogKA,t+1 −




















the trace, T, and the determinant, D, of the associated Jacobian matrix, J,
being given, respectively, by T =
(1−θ)−α(1−θ+ν)
(1−α)(1−θ)(1−θ+ν) and D =
θ(1−θ)
(1−α)(1−θ)(1−θ+ν).
The eigenvalues of the 2x2 Jacobian matrix J are the roots of the char-
acteristic polynomial P (λ) ≡ λ2 − Tλ+ D. Since there is only one pre-
determined variable (capital), indeterminacy arises when both eigenvalues
(in absolute value) are lower than 1. This case will be obtained when,
simultaneously, D>T− 1,D<1 and D>−T − 1. The condition
D>T− 1 ⇔ ν (1 − θ) > 0,i sa l w a y sv e r i ﬁed given that ν>0 and
θ<1. D<1 ⇔ (1 − θ)(α(1 − θ) − (1 − 2θ)) <ν (1 − θ)(1 − α).S i n c e
α(1 − θ) > (1 − 2θ) under (14)-(15), both left and right hand side of






29Finally, D>−T −1 ⇔ 2(1−θ)(1− α(1 − θ)) >ν (1−θ)(2α − 1).T h e
left and right hand side of this inequality are both positive, since 2α−1 > 0
under (14). Hence the latter inequality is veriﬁed iﬀ ν<
2(1−α(1−θ))
(2α−1) ≡ ¯ νau,
with ¯ νau >v
¯
au i fa n do n l yi fα<1+2θ
1+3θ, the latter inequality being satisﬁed
under (14).¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3(Capital mobility). Under perfect capital
mobility, the Jacobian matrix, associated with the linearized system (24)-
(26) around the steady state, is given by
⎡
⎣
θ (1 − θ + ν)+(1− θ) dlnH
dlnlA
−θ(1−(1−α)(1−θ))














1 − θ + ν
1 − θ
sB,w i t hsB = z/(1 + z) ∈ (0,1). (B2)
Using (B2), the trace and determinant of the Jacobian matrix (B1) are,
respectively, equal to
T =
(1 − θ) − α(1 − θ + ν)(1 − x)(1− θ)−(1 − θ + ν)x
(1 − α)(1− θ)(1− θ + ν)(1− x)
(B3)
D =
θ(1 − θ) − θ(1 − θ + ν)x
(1 − α)(1− θ)(1− θ + ν)(1− x)
,( B 4 )
where x ≡ sB ∈ (0,1).
Since 1 − x>0, the denominator of both T and D is positive. The
condition D>T−1 ⇔ ν(1−θ) > 0,i sa l w a y sv e r i ﬁed given that ν>0 and
θ<1. D<1 ⇔ (1 − θ)
¡
1 − sB¢
(α(1 − θ) − (1 − 2θ)) <ν (1 − α)(1− θ)+
sB (α(1 − θ) − (1 − 2θ)).S i n c eα(1−θ) > (1−2θ) under (14)-(15), both left
and right hand side of the latter inequality are positive. Therefore, this in-




k.F i n a l l y ,D>−T −
1 ⇔ (1−sB)(1−θ)2(1 − α(1 − θ)) >ν
¡
(1 − θ)(2α − 1) + 2sB (1 − α(1 − θ))
¢
.
Both left and right hand sides of this inequality are positive, since 2α−1 > 0
under (14). Hence the latter inequality is veriﬁed iﬀ ν<
2(1−α(1−θ))(1−sB)
(2α−1)+2sB(1/(1−θ)−α) ≡
30¯ νk,w i t h¯ νk >v
¯
k if and only if α<1+2θ
1+3θ, the latter inequality being satisﬁed
under (14).¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n7(Capital and labor mobility). Since, equations
(34)-(35) are analogous to (24) and (26), the matrix given in (B1) still
represents the Jacobian matrix, associated with the linearized system (34)-
(35). However, using (36), the elasticity dlnH
dlnlA, as given in (B2), must now
be substituted by dln ˜ H
dlnlA, that is by the elasticity of ˜ H with respect to lA




1 − θ + ν
1 − θ
sB(1 − η) (B5)
By Lemma 4, η>1,h e n c esB(1 − η) < 0. Using (B1) and (B5) it can
be checked that, under labor mobility, the trace and determinant of the
Jacobian matrix are given by (B3) and (B4) with x ≡ sB(1 − η) < 0.
Since x∈ (−∞,0), 1−x>0 and the denominator of both T and D is pos-
itive. Hence, D>T−1 ⇔ ν(1−θ) > 0,w h i c hi sa l w a y sv e r i ﬁed. Also D<1
⇔ (α − (1 − 2θ)/(1 − θ))(1 − x) <ν ((1 − α)+( α − (1 − 2θ)/(1 − θ))x).
Since x ≡ sB (1 − η) < 0 and α(1 − θ) > (1 − 2θ) under (14)-(15), the
left hand side of the latter inequality is always positive. If sB (1 − η) <
−
(1−α)(1−θ)
α(1−θ)−(1−2θ) ⇔ η>η 1 ≡ 1+
(1−α)
(α−(1−2θ)/(1−θ))sB, the right hand side is neg-




¯l. Turning to the condition D>−T − 1, we have D>−T − 1 ⇔
2(1− α(1 − θ))(1 − x) >ν((2α − 1) + 2x(1/(1 − θ) − α)). The left hand
side of this inequality is always positive. Since, under (14), 2α − 1 > 0 the
right hand side can be negative or positive. If sB (1 − η) > −
(2α−1)
2[1/(1−θ)−α] ⇔
η<η 2 ≡ 1+
(2α−1)
2(1/(1−θ)−α)sB, the right hand side is positive. Hence, if η<η 2
and ν<
2(1−α(1−θ))(1−sB(1−η))
(2α−1)+2(1/(1−θ)−α)sB(1−η) ≡ ¯ νl,t h e nD>−T − 1.A l s oi fη>η 2,
then D>−T − 1.
Finally note that η1 >η 2 ⇔ α<1+2θ
1+3θ, the latter inequality being veriﬁed
under (14). Moreover, when α<1+2θ
1+3θ and η<η 2,t h e n¯ νl >v
¯
l. Accordingly,
the conditions for indeterminacy, D>T− 1, D<1 and D>−T − 1,
are simulataneously satisﬁed if and only if one of the conditions stated in
31Proposition 7 is veriﬁed.¥
32References
[1] Azariadis, C.,Pissarides, C.: Unemployment dynamics with interna-
tional capital mobility. European Economic Review 51, 27-48 (2007)
[2] Barinci, J.P., Chéron, A.: Sunspots and the Business Cycle in a Finance
Constrained Economy. Journal of Economic Theory 97, 30-49 (2001)
[3] Basu, S., Fernald, J. G.:Returns to scale in U.S. production: Estimates
and implications. Journal of Political Economy 105, 249-283 (1997)
[4] Bertocchi, G.: Labor market institutions, international capital mobility,
and the persistence of underdevelopment. Review of Economic Dynam-
ics 6, 637-650 (2003)
[5] Bertola, G., Boeri, T.: EMU Labor Markets Two Years On: Micro-
economic Tensions and Institutional Evolution. In: M.Buti, Sapir, A.
(eds.) EMU and Economic Policy in Europe: The Challenge of the
Early Years. Edward Elgar, Aldershot (2002)
[6] Bhagwati, J.: The Capital Myth. Journal of Foreign Aﬀairs, May/June
(1998)
[7] Burnside, C.: Production function regressions, returns to scale, and
externalities. Journal of Monetary Economics 37, 177-201 (1996)
[8] Coimbra, R., Lloyd-Braga, T., Modesto, L.: Endogenous Fluctuations
in Unionized Economies with Capital Externalities. Economic Theory
26, 629-649 (2005).
[9] Davis, D.: Does European Unemployment Prop Up American Wages?
National Labor Markets and Global Trade. American Economic Review
88, 478-494 (1998)
[10] Edwards, S., N. Lusting (eds.): Labor Markets in Latin America.
Brookings, Washington DC (1997)
[11] Farmer, R.: Macroeconomics of Self-fulﬁlling Prophecies, 2nd ed. MIT
Press (1999)
33[12] Freeman, R.: War of models: Which labour market institutions for the
21st century? Labour Economics 5, 1-24 (1998)
[13] Guesnerie, R., Woodford, M.: Endogenous Fluctuations. In: J.J.Laﬀont
(ed.) Advanced in Economic Theory:Proceedings of the Sixth World
Congress, Vol. 2. Cambridge University Press, New York (1992)
[14] Harris, J., Todaro, M.: Migration, Unemployment and Development:
A Two-Sector Analysis. American Economic Review 60, 126-142 (1970)
[15] ILO: Progress Report on the Country Studies on the Social Impact of
Globalisation. Geneva (1999)
[16] Lahiri, A.: Growth and equilibrium indeterminacy: the role of capital
mobility. Economic Theory 17, 197-208 (2001)
[17] Lloyd-Braga, T., Nourry, C., Venditti, A. Indeterminacy in dynamic
models: when Diamond meets Ramsey. Journal of Economic Theory
134, 513-536 (2007)
[18] Meng, Q., Velasco, A.: Indeterminacy in a small open economy with
endogenous labour supply. Economic Theory 22, 661-669 (2003)
[19] Obstfeld, M., Taylor, A. M.: Global Capital Markets. MIT Press (2004)
[20] Riboud, M., Sanchez-Paramo, C., Silva-Jauregui, C.: Does Euroscle-
rosis Matter? Institutional Reform and Labor Market Performance in
Central and Eastern European Countries in the 1990s. World Bank
Research Papers No. SP 0202 (2002)
[21] Rodrik, D.: Has Globalisation Gone Too Far? Institute for Interna-
tional Economics, Washington DC (1997)
[22] Prasad, E., Rogoﬀ,K . ,W e i ,S . ,K o s e ,M . :E ﬀects of Financial Global-
ization on Developing Countries: Some Empirical Evidence. IMF Oc-
casional Papers No. 220 (2003)
34[23] Sakuragawa, M., Hamada, K. Capital Flight, North-South Lending,
and Stages of Economic Development. International Economic Review
42, 1-24 (2001)
[24] Shapiro, C., Stiglitz, J.: Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Dis-
cipline Device. American Economic Review 74, 433-444 (1984)
[25] Scheve, K., M. Slaughter: Globalization and the Perceptions of Amer-
ican Workers. Institute for International Economics, Washington DC
(2001)
[26] Weder, M.: Indeterminacy in a Small Open Economy Ramsey Growth
Model. Journal of Economic Theory 98, 339-356 (2001)
35Working Paper List 2008 
Number   Author   Title  
08/10   Marta Aloi, Manuel Leite-
Monteiro and Teresa Lloyd-Braga  
Unionized Labor Markets and Globalized Capital Markets  
08/09   Simona Mateut, Spiros Bougheas 
and Paul Mizen  
Corporate trade credit and inventories: New evidence of a 
tradeoff from accounts payable and receivable  
08/08   Christos Koulovatianos, Leonard 
J. Mirman and Marc Santugini  
Optimal Growth and Uncertainty: Learning  
08/07   Christos Koulovatianos, Carsten 
Schröder and Ulrich Schmidt  
Nonmarket Household Time and the Cost of Children  
08/06   Christiane Baumeister, Eveline 
Durinck and Gert Peersman  
Liquidity, Inflation and Asset Prices in a Time-Varying 
Framework for the Euro Area  
08/05   Sophia Mueller-Spahn   The Pass Through From Market Interest Rates to Retail Bank 
Rates in Germany  
08/04   Maria Garcia-Vega and 
Alessandra Guariglia  
Volatility, Financial Constraints and Trade  
08/03   Richard Disney and John 
Gathergood  
Housing Wealth, Liquidity Constraints and Self-Employment  
08/02   Paul Mizen and Serafeim Tsoukas   What Effect has Bond Market Development in Asia had on the 
Issue of Corporate Bonds  
08/01   Paul Mizen and Serafeim Tsoukas   Modelling the Persistence of Credit Ratings When Firms Face 
Financial Constraints, Recessions and Credit Crunches  
 
Working Paper List 2007 
Number  Author  Title 
07/11   Rob Carpenter and Alessandra 
Guariglia  
Investment Behaviour, Observable Expectations, and Internal 
Funds: a comments on Cummins et al, AER (2006)  
07/10   John Tsoukalas   The Cyclical Dynamics of Investment: The Role of Financing 
and Irreversibility Constraints  
07/09   Spiros Bougheas, Paul Mizen and 
Cihan Yalcin  
An Open Economy Model of the Credit Channel Applied to 
Four Asian Economies  
07/08   Paul Mizen & Kevin Lee   Household Credit and Probability Forecasts of Financial 
Distress in the United Kingdom  
07/07   Tae-Hwan Kim, Paul Mizen & Alan 
Thanaset  
Predicting Directional Changes in Interest Rates: Gains from 
Using Information from Monetary Indicators  
07/06   Tae-Hwan Kim, and Paul Mizen   Estimating Monetary Reaction Functions at Near Zero Interest 
Rates: An Example Using Japanese Data  
07/05   Paul Mizen, Tae-Hwan Kim and 
Alan Thanaset  
Evaluating the Taylor Principle Over the Distribution of the 
Interest Rate: Evidence from the US, UK & Japan  
07/04   Tae-Hwan Kim, Paul Mizen and 
Alan Thanaset  
Forecasting Changes in UK Interest rates  
07/03   Alessandra Guariglia   Internal Financial Constraints, External Financial Constraints, 
and Investment Choice: Evidence From a Panel of UK Firms  
07/02   Richard Disney   Household Saving Rates and the Design of Public Pension 
Programmes: Cross-Country Evidence  
07/01   Richard Disney, Carl Emmerson 
and Matthew Wakefield  
Public Provision and Retirement Saving: Lessons from the U.K.  Working Paper List 2006 
Number   Author   Title  
06/04   Paul Mizen & Serafeim Tsoukas   Evidence on the External Finance Premium from the US and 
Emerging Asian Corporate Bond Markets  
06/03   Woojin Chung, Richard Disney, 
Carl Emmerson & Matthew 
Wakefield  
Public Policy and Retirement Saving Incentives in the U.K.  
06/02   Sarah Bridges & Richard Disney   Debt and Depression  
06/01   Sarah Bridges, Richard Disney & 
John Gathergood  
Housing Wealth and Household Indebtedness: Is There a 
'Household Financial Accelerator'?  
 
Working Paper List 2005 
Number   Author   Title  
05/02   Simona Mateut and Alessandra 
Guariglia  
Credit channel, trade credit channel, and inventory 
investment: evidence from a panel of UK firms  
05/01   Simona Mateut, Spiros Bougheas 
and Paul Mizen  
Trade Credit, Bank Lending and Monetary Policy Transmission  
 
 